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ALLOCATING JURISDICTION OVER RACIAL ISSUES
BETWEEN THE EEOC AND NLRB: A PROPOSAL
The National Labor Relations Board is presently engaged in a
diversified attack on racial discrimination in employment.1 At the same
time, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has the duty
of administering 2 the prohibition against racial discrimination in employment, found in title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.3 The EEOC
now possesses no significant enforcement powers,4 so very little conflict presently exists between it and the NLRB. 5 Legislation now pending before Congress, however, will confer enforcement powers on the
EEOC.6 Passage of that legislation will create an undesirable conflict
1 Two studies on racial discrimination in employment have given special treatment
to the role of the National Labor Relations Board. M. SovmEm, LEGAL REsTapws ON
RA-IAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 143-75 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SovE.N];
Rosen, The Law and Racial Discriminationin Employment, 53 CALIF. L. R.v. 729, 781-98
(1965).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
3 Section 703 of the Act states:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) ....
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail
or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
4 Its powers are limited for the most part to investigation and conciliation. Id. §
705(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1964).
5 Informal discussions concerning the overlap have taken place between the two
agencies, however. Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: A PreliminaryStudy in Federal-StateInteragency Relations, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv.

846, 891 (1966).
6 H.R. 6228, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 6229, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). The
two bills are identical in substance. Section 2 of H.R. 6228 continues title VIIs provisions
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between the EEOC and NLRB concerning their respective roles in
the task of eliminating racial discrimination from employment. Prior
to passage,7 therefore, it should be determined how jurisdiction over
racial issues will be allocated between the two agencies. The choices are
three: concurrent jurisdiction, s exclusive jurisdiction in one agency, 9
or an apportionment of power between the two.
I
UNION RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

A. NLRB Procedures to Eliminate Union Racial Discrimination
Although the Labor Management Relations Act is silent on the
issue of union racial discrimination, the NLRB has developed a number of procedures to sanction discriminating unions. 10 A review of
directing the EEOC to defer first to state fair employment practices commissions and to
seek voluntary compliance with its orders. But, if all else fails, the section empowers the
EEOC to issue cease and desist orders and to provide affirmative relief. Both procedures
are enforceable in the federal courts. In effect, the bills give the EEOC the same enforcement powers as the NLRB. Neither bill deals with the issue of jurisdictional conflict
between the EEOC and NLRB.
The recommendations in this note are contingent upon the passage of these or similar
amendments.
7 Passage of this legislation is by no means certain. Title VII itself originally conferred
enforcement powers on the EEOC, but the powers were deleted and the Commission limited
essentially to the function of conciliation in order that title VII could pass. For the legislative history of title VII see Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 31 BrLYN. L. REv. 62, 64-68 (1964). Since 1964, amendments have been
offered that would give the Commission enforcement powers, but none have been successful.
See, e.g., H.R. 10065, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 8465, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
The EEOC clearly needs the power to enforce title Vii's provisions:
. . . [T]itle VII pays lip service to the idea of equal employment opportunity,
but the hard fact is that the compromise worked out in 1964 under which the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was emasculated, has gone far
to destroy the act as an effective tool to end discrimination in employment in
this country.
114 CONG. RFeC. S. 7093 (daily ed. June 12, 1968) (comments of Senator Javits on S. 3465).
See also N.Y. Times, April 10, 1969, at 46, col. 2.
8 See, e.g., SovERN 174; Berg, supra note 7, at 95; Hickey, Government Regulation of
Union Racial Policies, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 191, 230 (1966).
9 Arguably, title VII preempts NLRB jurisdiction over racial issues. See, e.g., Note,
Applicability of Unfair Labor Practices to Racial Discrimination: Enforcement Under
Civil Rights Act, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 321, 327-28 (1965). But, it appears that Congress did not
recognize the issue of overlapping jurisdiction in 1964 (see note 65 infra), and it is therefore futile to attempt to determine whether title VII was intended to preempt NLRB
jurisdiction over racial issues. Instead, it should be recognized that the overlap does exist,
that if the EEOC gains enforcement powers the problem will be intensified, and that a
solution is required.
10 A more extensive examination of the NLRB procedures outlined in this note is
found in SovmuR at 155-71.
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these procedures provides a basis for determining how racial issues can
be divided between the EEOC and NLRB,
Section 9 of the LMRA states that the employees' bargaining
representative shall be the exclusive representative of all employees
in the bargaining unit.1 1 Because of the exclusivity of this statutorily
created status, the Supreme Court has held that a duty to represent
fairly all employees in the unit is implicit in section 9.12 This duty
includes an obligation not to discriminate on racial grounds. 3 Under
the Supreme Court cases, the section 9 duty of fair representation
is enforceable in the federal courts in a proceeding not involving the
NLRB. 14 Building upon the duty of fair representation implicit in
section 9, however, the Board has developed two methods of opposing
union racial discrimination.
The first, called by Sovern "Denying the Board's Imprimatur,"'5
is to deny the Board's aid to a discriminating union. The Board can
7
refuse to certify a union, 16 rescind certification previously granted,
8
withhold an order directing an employer to bargain, or allow one
union to be prematurely ousted by another. 19 The Board's exercise of
these restraints is based on its recognition of the union's section 9 duty
of fair representation and of the impropriety of giving aid to a union
which has breached that duty. These steps play a role in eliminating
discrimination, but because of their passive nature, they provide little
deterrent to strong unions.20 The second method of enforcement, which
has more teeth in it, is the use of unfair labor practice proceedings
against unions that engage in racial discrimination. Three such unfair
labor practices have been developed by the Board.
11 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 29 US.C. §
159(a) (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
12 E.g., Syres v. Oil Wkrs. Int'l Local 23, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g mem. 223 F.2d 739 (5th
Cir. 1955); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S 248 (1944) (dictum); Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
13 E.g., Syres v. Oil Wkrs. Int'l Local 23, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g mem. 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.
1955); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
14 See cases cited id.
'5 SoVEM 156.
10 The Board has not used this sanction, but Sovern mentions it as a possibility. Id.

at 158.
17 E.g., Independent Metal Wkrs. Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964);
A.O. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1210
(1955).
18 Like refusal of certification, this procedure has not yet been used by the NLRB.
SOvmRN 158-59.
19 E.g., Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962) (removal of the "contract-bar").
20 An employer will bargain with a strong union even if not forced to do so by the
NLRB, for to do otherwise would be to invite labor strife.
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The first concerns section 8(b)(1)(A). 21 Beginning with the Miranda
Fuel Co. decision in 1962,22 the Board has reasoned that the right to fair
representation is also implicit in the section 7 right "to bargain collectively through representatives of [the employees'] own choosing .... ,,23
Since section 8(b)(1)(A) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for a
union to "restrain or coerce.., employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 ... .,"24 unfair treatment of an employee by a
union violates this provision. A number of decisions since Mirandahave
held that racial discrimination by a union violates section 8(b)(1)(A).2 5
The second unfair labor practice is based upon section 8(b)(3).26
Under that section, a union must bargain in good faith with the employer.27 The Board, however, finds this duty of bargaining in good
faith to be owed to the employees as well as to the employer, and then
interprets "good faith" to include the duty of fair representation.2 8
Accordingly, if racial discrimination taints any part of the collective
bargaining process, a union violates its 8(b)(3) duty to bargain fairly
29
concerning all employees.
21 LMRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).

22 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
23 LMRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
24 Id. § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
25 E.g., Local No. 12, United Rubber, C., L. & P. Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1966), enforcing 150 N.L.R.B. 812 (1964); UAW (Maremont Corp.), 149 N.L.R.B. 482
(1964); Local 1367, ILA (Galveston Maritime Ass'n), 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964). Miranda
itself did not involve a racial issue. See 140 N.L.R.B. at 181.
The Board's finding of an 8(b)(1)(A) violation based upon breach of the duty of fair
representation has met with criticism:
1. As a correlative to the right of representation under Section 9(b) of. the
Act, a bargaining representative owes a duty fairly and impartially to represent
all employees in the bargaining unit.
2. However, there is nothing in the wording of Section 7 or of Section
8 (b) (1) (A), and nothing in the legislative history of the Wagner Act and of its
subsequent amendments, which indicates that Congress intended to make the right
of fair representation a protected Section 7 right. On the contrary, the legislative history indicates, in our opinion, that Congress had no such intention. There
are also practical and policy reasons, set forth in our separate opinion in
Hughes Tool [147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1578 (1964)], why the Board should not read
a right of fair representation into Section 7 without a clear mandate from Congress.
Local No. 12, United Rubber, C., L. & P. Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 324 (1964) (Chairman
McCulloch and Member Fanning, dissenting). See also NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Note, Administrative Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: The Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. Rzv. 711, 718 (1964).
26 LMRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964).
27 The good faith requirement is found in § 8(d), which defines 8(b)(3)'s mandate
to bargain collectively. Id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
28 See, e.g., Independent Metal Wkrs. Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573,
1577, 1591-93, 1604 (1964).
29 E.g., Local 12, United Rubber, C., L. & P. Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966), enforcing 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Local 1367, ILA (Galveston Maritime Ass'n), 148
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The two preceding unfair labor practices are based upon the transfer of section 9's duty of fair representation into sections 7 and 8, but
a union's racial policies can constitute unfair labor practices without
dependence on fair representation. Thus, a union violates section
8(b)(3) if it insists, against the wishes of the employer, upon the inclusion of racially discriminatory provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement.30 This violation stems from the Borg-Warner rule that if
the employer may lawfully refuse to bargain over a particular demand,
the union may not insist upon the demand.3 1 It is clear that an employer may properly refuse to bargain over a union's racially discriminatory demands, for such demands are expressly prohibited by
32
federal legislation.
Another union unfair labor practice with racial application, but
not based upon the duty of fair representation, involves section 8(b)(2). 33
The section states that a union may not "cause or attempt to cause"
an employer to discriminate against employees either in violation of
N.L.R.B. 897 (1964); Independent Metal Wkrs. Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B.
1573 (1964).
The argument that the transfer of § 9's "fair representation" into § 7 and § 8 is
erroneous can also be leveled against this 8(b)(3) theory. Note 25 supra. However, a more
fundamental criticism of this 8(b)(3) interpretation is that although § 8(b)(3) appears to
impose a bargaining obligation on unions that is identical to the employers' duty under
§ 8(a)(5), the Board has added to § 8(b)(3) an obligation of fair representation, owed to the
employees, that has no counterpart in § 8(a)(5):
The difficulty with [the Board's 8(b)(3) theory] is that the context in which
the words "confer in good faith" appear gives repeated evidence of concern with
the duties of the employer and union to each other, but no evidence at all of
concern with the duty of unions to those they represent.... [T]he statute speaks
of the "mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees," thereby implying that obligations to others are not the subject of this provision.... [T]he duty to "confer in good faith" is imposed upon employers and
unions alike. . . . [This] imports comparable obligations and, of course, an employer can have no obligation comparable to the duty of fair representation.
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUiv. L. RaV.
563, 588 (1962).
The 8(b)(3) theory advocated by the Board has yet to be judicially recognized. The
court, in Local No. 12, United Rubber, C., L. & P. Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th
Cir. 1966), found an 8(b)(1)(A) violation but did not consider the alleged 8(b)(3) violation.
30 No case to date has utilized this theory. SovERN 170.
31 NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
32 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) (note 3 supra).
33 Section 8(b)(2) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for a union

to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure

to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
LMRA § 8(b)(2), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
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section 8(a)(3), or because of the employees' unreasonable exclusion
from union membership. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits employers from
discriminating "to encourage or discourage" union membership. 34
There are two categories of such 8(b)(2) violations-those stemming
from racial discrimination directed at non-union workers, and those
concerning discriminatory treatment of workers who are union
members.
In the former category, most violations occur in the context of
closed shops, 35 improperly operated union shops, 36 or exclusive hiring
hall arrangements. 3 In such situations union membership is often a
prerequisite to gaining or continuing employment. When the union
refuses membership to a worker because of his race, it "causes" the
employer to wrongfully discharge or refuse to hire the worker.38 The
employer's refusal to hire or his discharge violates section 8(a)(3) because it "encourages" union membership; 39 consequently the union,
in violation of section 8(b)(2), has "cause[d] ... an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection [8](a)(3)

....

,,40

The second category of 8(b)(2) violations, developed by the Board
since Miranda, involves union racial discrimination directed at workers who are union members. Examples are the refusal to process grievances for non-white union members 4' and the relegation of black members to low paying positions. As stated in Miranda,the violation occurs
when, "for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair
classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer
to derogate the employment status of an employee. ' '42 The Board
34 Id. § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
35 Closed shops are outlawed by § 8(a)(3), but closed shop violations continue to
occur. E.g., NLR.B v. American Dredging Co., 276 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1960); Wolfer Printing
Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 695 (1963); Yuba Consol. Indus., Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 683 (1962).
36 Union shops are permitted under § 8(a)(3), but a union cannot deny membership
for reasons that are, inter alia, based upon racial discrimination. LMRA §§ 8(a)(3)(A), (B),
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3)(A), (B) (1964).
37 Hiring hall agreements are not prohibited, but the hall must not be restricted
to union members. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 265 U.S. 667 (1961).
38 E.g., El Diario Publishing Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 965 (1955); Peerless Quaries, Inc., 92
N.L.R.B. 1194, enforced, 193 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1951). In a union shop, the discharge is
"wrongful" only if the 8(a)(3) provisos, (A) or (B), are violated. Note 26 supra.
39 See cases cited in note 38 supra. The encouragement is of two types. First, Negroes
are encouraged to become union members, even though they are ineligible because of
their race. Second, the employer's actions encourage membership in general, black or
white, for it is made clear that without such membership employment will be impossible.
40 LMRA § 8(b)(2), 29 US.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
41 E.g., Independent Metal Wkrs. Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
42 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.RB. 181, 186 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963).
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applies its 8(b)(2) theories43 very broadly in both categories, and
Sovern notes that the combination of the two categories of 8(b)(2) violations, neither based upon the duty of fair representation, makes
8(b)(2)'s coverage coextensive with the duty of fair representation
under section 8(b)(l)(A).44
B. A Proposalfor Allocating Jurisdiction
Of the two schemes of enforcement just outlined, the first, denying
the Board's imprimatur, should be retained in its entirety by the
NLRB. Arguably this retention is constitutionally required. 45 Even if
43 As applied to union members, the Board's 8(b)(2) theory has been criticized. To
violate § 8(b)(2) a union must "cause or attempt to cause" an employer to engage in
discrimination that violates § 8(a)(3); the latter section requires that the employer discriminate "to encourage or discourage" union membership. Absent either causation, or encouragement or discouragement, there appears to be no violation. The Board's application
of § 8(b)(2) to discrimination against union members has run afoul of both requirements.
In Hughes Tool and Local 12, United Rubber Workers, the Board found 8(b)(2)
violations where the union refused to process grievances because of race. As pointed out
by Sovern, neither case involved any recognizable "causing or attempting to cause"
vis-At-vis the employer. SOVmN 169. The Board seems to equate an employer's acquiescence
in union discrimination with the employer himself being "caused" to discriminate; the
validity of this reasoning is doubtful. For a fuller discussion of this criticism see Independent Metal Wkrs. Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1591 (1964)
(Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning, dissenting); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
181, 193 (1962) (Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning, dissenting).
Even if a causal relationship is present, § 8(a)(3) is usually thought to require employer
discrimination that is intended to encourage or discourage union membership. But if the
worker being discriminated against is a union member, the employer's motivation for the
discrimination is most likely race-not the encouragement or discouragement of union
membership. For a discussion of this criticism see NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d
172, 179 (2d Cir. 1963); Independent Metal Wkrs. Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B.
1573, 1591 (1964) (Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning, dissenting); Miranda Fuel
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1962) (Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning, dissenting).
Contra, NLR.B v. Miranda Fuel Co., supra at 181-84 (dissent).
44 SovERN 169. None of the 8(b)(1), (2), or (3) theories has been reviewed by the
Supreme Court, and the Court has expressly declined to decide the issue of whether a
breach of the duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice. Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344
(1964); Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696 n.7 (1963). One might argue that
if the Supreme Court upholds these unfair labor practices, the NLRB will preempt
the EEOC and have exclusive jurisdiction under the Garmon rule. San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 859 U.S. 236 (1959). However, this position has been effectively
rebutted by Rosen, supra note 5, at 889-90. Professor Rosen points out that exceptions to
the Garmon rule are many, and that one would certainly be formulated in this area if
necessary.
45 In finding the duty of fair representation to be implicit in § 9 of the LMRA the
Supreme Court indicated that the holding was constitutionally required because of the
otherwise unbounded powers of the statutorily created bargaining representative. Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). Accordingly, it might also be constitutionally required that the Board not assist unions that violate the duty.
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not, it would be anomalous for the LMRA to prohibit unfair representation in section 9 and, at the same time, allow the Board to support
discriminating unions through certification, orders to bargain, and
application of the contract-bar doctrine. Since the Board's refusal to
give such aid is essentially passive, its retention of this power presents
little opportunity for conflict with the EEOC. To eliminate any conflict
which might develop, however, the Board could require a preliminary
EEOC finding of racial discrimination before refusing to give aid to a
union.
Unfair labor practice proceedings present a more complex problem. If they are retained in their entirety by the Board, and if the EEOC
gains enforcement powers so that it too can sanction discriminating
unions, conflict will develop between the two agencies, probably resulting in administrative inefficiency and its consequent injustices. On
the other hand, the Board should not be stripped of all unfair labor
practice jurisdiction over racial issues, for in some instances racial
issues are integrally involved with other non-racial unfair labor practices. 46 Accordingly, a method of apportionment must be developed
under which the Board can continue to prohibit union racial practices
that substantially undermine the efficacy of the LMRA, and at the same
time defer to EEOC jurisdiction in matters that are peripheral to organizational and collective bargaining processes. Put another way, the
EEOC should have primacy in the field of racial discrimination, but
not to such an extent that the NLRB is hindered in administering the
Labor Management Relations Act. Such apportionment can be effectuated if the Board's scope of authority is limited to handling racial issues
only when they are connected with some other independent exercise
of its jurisdiction.
Two changes are necessary to effect this allocation. First, the union's
duty of fair representation, in those cases in which it overlaps title VII's
prohibitions'47 should be denied its implicit presence in sections 7 and
8 of the LMRA.4s This completely eliminates the 8(b)(l)(A) violations
based upon racial discrimination. 49 Although the 8(b)(3) Borg-Warner
46 As will become apparent in the ensuing discussion, many unfair labor practices
involve some degree of union racial discrimination. Only when racial discrimination is
the central issue should the EEOC have priority; otherwise the Board's power in the field
of labor relations is unduly hindered.
47 The overlap occurs when the unfair representation is based upon "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
48 The 8(b)(1)(A) violation depends upon the presence of the right of fair representation in § 7, while the 8(b)(3) violation depends upon 8(d)'s "good faith" being interpreted
as containing the duty of fair representation.
49 Miranda is an example of a fair representation case involving no racial issue and
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violations would be retained, 50 the only non-Borg-Warner 8(b)(3) violations within NLRB jurisdiction would be those based on grounds
other than union racism. 51 The Board would thus be prevented from
declaring racial discrimination by itself to be an unfair labor practice
52
under either section.
The fundamental argument for the apportionment suggested here
is that the NLRB's primary concern is with labor relations, not race
relations, and that the Board should not extend itself into an area with
which another agency, the EEOC, is better equipped to deal. Additional
support, however, derives from the questionable statutory foundation
of the 8(b)(1)(A) and the non-Borg-Warner8(b)(3) violations.5 3 By itself,
this lack of statutory basis seems not so great as to support an argument
that the Board should abandon entirely these violations. But when the
express grant of power over racial issues to the EEOC is added to the
NLRB's expansion of section 8, the combination arguably supports the
selective limitation suggested here.
A second necessary change involves section 8(b)(2). Under the
Board's interpretation this section subjects the union to a duty almost
as broad in scope as 8(b)(1)(A)'s duty of fair representation. Consequently, limiting sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(3) will accomplish little
if the Board's 8(b)(2) theories remain unaltered. The pre-Miranda
8(b)(2) violations based on racial discrimination against non-union
workers should be retained, but the Board should be deprived of jurisdiction over the post-Mirandaviolations involving racial discrimination
against union members. Like the apportionment suggested under sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(8), this division is supported by a recognition
of the proper sphere of activity of each agency. The Board has a clear
therefore it would be unaffected by these limitations of NLRB jurisdiction. Miranda Fuel
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
5o Although racial discrimination might be the subject upon which an impasse is
reached in the Borg-Warner 8(b)(3) violation, the fundamental issue raised by such violations is the viability of the collective bargaining process. The Board must retain its power
to supervise collective bargaining even if in so doing it enters into the EEOC's sphere
of race relations.
51 Because Borg-Warner 8(b)(3) violations are not based upon the right of fair representation, p. 947 supra, they are not affected by removing fair representation from § 7
and § 8. Non-Borg-Warner 8(b)(3) violations that are not based upon racism will be
eliminated if the courts reject the Board's theory that the union's bargaining duty is
owed to the employees as well as the employer. See note 29 supra.
52 Union conduct merely involving racial discrimination, however, could still constitute an unfair labor practice so long as the discrimination was not the touchstone of the
violation. For example, a union would violate § 8(b)(1)(A) if it brutalized black workers
for attempting to organize. The violent interference with § 7 rights, not the underlying
discrimination, would be the basis for the violation.
53 See notes 25 & 29 supra.
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statutory interest in assuring that non-union workers receive no stigma
because of their lack of membership (except to the extent that a properly operated union shop allows otherwise5 4). This issue remains important to the Board even when the lack of union membership stems from
racial prejudice. However, once the worker becomes a union member,
the principal issue is racial discrimination. In this area the EEOC has a
clearly defined statutory interest which should take priority.55
II
EMPLOYER RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Until recently, it was thought that the NLRB did not possess statutory authority to prohibit an employer from engaging in racially discriminatory employment practices. Such practices have been collaterally
involved in employer unfair labor practices, 56 but employer racial discrimination alone was never considered to violate the LMRA. Accordingly, there appeared to be no significant conflict between title VII's
prohibition of employer racial discrimination and the Labor Act. Recently, however, in United Packinghousev. NLRB the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia ruled that an employer's policy and practice of invidious racial discrimination constituted a violation of section
8(a)(1),5 7 If the decision is followed, the potential jurisdictional conflict
between the EEOC and NLRB is clear.
54 See notes 36 & 38 supra. When the union's discrimination does not cause loss of
employment to non-union workers, it is more difficult to fulfill § 8(b)(2)'s two requirements. See note 43 supra. Thus most such 8(b)(2) violations will probably entail dismissals
or refusals to hire by the employer.
55 As with the removal of jurisdiction under § 8(b)(1)(A) and § 8(b)(3), the apportion.
ment suggested here has additional support (see note 56 infra & accompanying text)
because the second category of 8(b)(2) racial violations stands on a questionable statutory
interpretation (see note 43 stipra & accompanying text).
56 E.g., NLR.B v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965) (employees
wrongfully discharged for protesting company's discriminatory hiring policies); Ozan
Lumber Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1942) (company rules and action based on racism prevented

employees from exercising their § 7 rights); American Cyanamid Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 578
(1941), as amended, 39 N.L.R.B. 1129 (1942) (racial segregation by company resulted in
interference with § 7 rights).
57 United Packinghouse v. NLRB, Civil No. 21-627 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 1969), enforcing
and modifying Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 169 N.L.R.E. No. 70 (1968), The case was remanded to the NLRB to determine whether racial discrimination was in fact present. the remand was probably unnecessary in light of the evidence showing discrimination, but the
8(a)(1) theory had not been fully litigated below, and the court therefore found a new hearing
desirable. The court also instructed the Board, if it found such disci-imination to be
present, to "devise an appropriate remedy." Id. at -.
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A. United Packinghouse
Three company policies in United Packinghouse evidenced racial
discrimination: White employees received higher wages and positions;
overtime work was given only to whites; and vacation benefits were
better for whites than for non-whites. The union attempted to eliminate these discriminatory practices through collective bargaining, but
the bargaining sessions ended in a strike and the filing of charges with
the NLRB. Among the union's allegations was the charge that the
company's racial practices violated section 8(a)(1) of the LMRA.58 This
particular charge was ignored by the trial examiner and the Board, 9
but the union was successful on this point before the court of appeals.
Section 8(a)(1) states that "[flit shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . "0 Section 7 guarantees, inter alia, the employees' right "to engage in... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection... ,"I and the Board construes this guarantee as protecting
employee activities aimed at eliminating an employer's racially discriminatory employment practices.0 2 In United Packinghouse the court
held that an employer's racial discrimination inhibits these protected
activities and therefore violates section 8(a)(1). 61 The court found that
58 In addition to charging that racial discrimination violated § 8(a)(1), the union
alleged two other unfair labor practices. One involved the company's attempts to undermine the collective bargaining process in violation of § 8(a)(1), and the other related to
the company's failure to bargain in good faith in violation of § 8(a)(5). Both violations
were established.
59 Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1968); Farmers' Cooperative
Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (Tr. Examiner 1967). Apparently the General Counsel
did not issue a complaint for the 8(a)(1) charge. There was precedent for this refusal.
Case No. K-311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (General Counsel, 1956); Case No. 1047, 35 L.R.R.M.
1130 (General Counsel, 1954).
60 LMRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
01 Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
62 Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964), modified, 349 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1965).
63F.2d at -. Compare Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964),
modified, 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965). In that case the employer discharged two employees
for picketing against the company's discriminatory hiring policy. Since the employer had
interfered with a protected activity, there was an 8(a)(1) violation. Under United Packinghouse, however, it appears that Tanner would commit the unfair labor practice even
without the discharges; its discriminatory hiring policy alone would interfere with the
employees' § 7 right to act concertedly for the elimination of racial discrimination.
United Packinghouse leaves the scope of this new unfair labor practice uncertain.
If the case is limited to its particular facts, the violation occurs only if employees
are engaged in protected activities aimed at eliminating discrimination. In such situations
it can be said that the activities are interfered with by the presence of discrimination.
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racial discrimination has a twofold effect: First, it divides employees
and reduces their opportunities to work in concert; second, it instills
docility in non-white workers and discourages them from asserting
their section 7 rights. 64
The result reached in United Packinghouse is admirable on policy
grounds, but its validity in terms of legislative intent 65 and statutory
However, the case can also be interpreted to say that employer racial discrimination
interferes with all protected activities, whether or not the activities have as their purpose
the elimination of racial discrimination. Even in the absence of any activities on the part
of the employees, it might be argued that the racial discrimination interferes with inchoate
§ 7 rights, thus creating a per se violation in every situation where an employer engages
in racial practices. The decision is also unclear in that the court provided no guidelines
on what constitutes "invidious" discrimination.
04 As stated by the court:
(I) [Radal discrimination sets up an unjustified dash of interests between groups
of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood and the effectiveness of their
working in concert to achieve their legitimate goals under the Act; and (2) racial
discrimination creates in its victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them
from asserting their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination. We find
that the confluence of these two factors sufficiently deters the exercise of Section 7
rights as to violate Section 8 (a)(1).
F.2d at - (emphasis by the court; footnote omitted).
05 Board enforcement of the duty of union fair representation and employer nondiscrimination are both suspect on the grounds of legislative intent. Congress has rejected
amendments to the LMRA which would expressly make both union and employer racial
discrimination unfair labor practices. E.g., S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. 1897, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). In the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a grant of enforcement powers similar
to the NLRB's was removed from title VII in order that the Act could pass, thereby indicating Congress's disfavor with Board-type enforcement of racial impartiality. See Berg,
supra note 7, at 64-68. Board enforcement of the employer duty formulated in United
Packinghouse is even more subject to criticism than is the correlative enforcement of
union fair representation, since the union duty of fair representation is admittedly part
of the LMRA, albeit that part is § 9, while the employer's duty not to discriminate has
no identifiable source in the Act. Congress has amended the Labor Act t3vo times since
the Supreme Court first held that unions have a duty of fair representation under the Act,
both times implicitly accepting the substantive principle. No similar argument is possible
in support of the substantive principle developed in United Packinghouse.
The court noted in United Packinghouse that in 1964 Congress explicitly refrained
from ousting any agency from jurisdiction over racial matters. - F.2d at - n.11. That is
correct, but it is incorrect to infer that Congress thereby endorsed NLRB jurisdiction
over racial matters; the evidence shows that Congress's silence on this point merely indicated its failure to foresee the Board's entry into the field. Although a Department of
Justice memorandum read to the Senate by Senator Clark said that title VII would not
deprive the NLRB of any jurisdiction, the memorandum referred only to jurisdiction
then exercised by the Board. 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964). See United Packinghouse v.
NLRB, - F.2d -, - n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1969). At that time, Miranda presaged the Board's
involvement in the area of union fair representation, but Miranda involved no racial
issue. Likewise, it was certainly not contemplated in 1964 that an employer's racial
practices alone would violate § 8(a)(1). Significant also was Senator Tower's unsuccessful
amendment to make title VII remedies exclusive. 110 CONG. Rc. 13650-52 (1964) (cited
in United Packinghouse v. NLRB, supra at - n.ll). Read in context, however, it is clear
that it was proposed only as a limitation upon the President's Equal Opportunity Coin-
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interpretation66 is doubtful. Nevertheless, the decision might be followed,67 thereby creating a jurisdictional conflict between the EEOC
and NLRB. An assessment of the proper roles of the two agencies in the
field of employer racial discrimination is therefore required.
B. ApportioningJurisdictionover Employer Racial Discrimination
As in the sphere of union racial discrimination, the NLRB should
not be completely stripped of its power to act against an employer's
racial practices. In particular, four types of Board intervention should
be retained: (1) An employer's refusal to bargain in good faith concerning the elimination of discriminatory racial practices should violate section 8(a)(5); 68 (2) employer interference with the employee right
to act concertedly toward the elimination of racial discrimination
should constitute an 8(a)(1) violation;6 9 (3) the Board should have the
power to set aside elections when inflammatory racial propaganda has
influenced their outcome; 70 and (4) NLRB activity premised on other
jurisdictional grounds should not be eliminated merely because of tangential racial discrimination. 71 These activities are all essential to the
Board's duty of administering the LMRA. The EEOC, however, should
72
have concurrent jurisdiction in these areas.
mission. See 110 CONG. REc. 13650 (1964). Consequently, although the Civil Rights Act
did not remove any racial jurisdiction from the NLRB, neither did it endorse any.
66 The main issues concerning statutory interpretation relate to the scope of the
unfair labor practice and the type of discrimination prohibited. Both are briefly discussed
in note 63 supra.
67 It seems probable that the General Counsel will continue to refuse to issue complaints on this 8(a)(1) theory (supranote 59), and the Board itself argued against the theory
before the court of appeals. - F.2d at -. Accordingly, only when a complainant can
allege another violation upon which the General Counsel will issue a complaint will the
issue reach the Board. Even then, the Board might reject the 8(a)(1) theory, and the
complainant would be forced to go to a court of appeals.
68 United Packinghouse v. NLRB, -

F.2d

-,

-

(D.C. Cir. 1969). No other decision

has been found which reaches this result, but it appears to be a valid application of the
rule that both employer and union have a duty to bargain in good faith concerning
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." LMRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1964). In this area the Board cannot force an employer to refrain from discrimination-it can only force him to bargain. Thus there is no significant conflict between
this procedure and the EEOC's activities.
69 NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965). The Tanner
rule is arguably too great an infringement upon the EEOC's domain, yet the Board should
recognize the § 7 right to protest racial discrimination. As long as the employer does not
unlawfully interfere with such protests (through discharge or other penalties), the Board
would have no jurisdiction.
70 E.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962). The function of
supervising representation elections is peculiar to the NLRB, and there is no conflict
here with the EEOC procedures against discriminating unions.
71 See examples cited in note 56 supra.
72 Concurrent jurisdiction creates little or no conflict in the first or third situations,
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The 8(a)(1) violation formulated in United Packinghouse is not
essential to the Board's functions. The NLRB has operated for thirtyfour years without the power to prohibit employer racial discrimination, and it can continue to so operate. If the EEOC had possessed enforcement powers similar to those of the NLRB, it is possible that no
court would have found it necessary to formulate a theory like the one
propounded in United Packinghouse." Accordingly, if the EEOC does
acquire such powers, it alone should act in this field.7 4
CONCLUSION

This allocation of power seeks an operative solution to a problem
of jurisdictional overlap between the NLRB and 1tEOC. 7 5 It continues

NLRB jurisdiction in those areas where it is essential, but recognizes
that the EEOC 8hould shoulder the major responsibility of eliminating
racial discrimination from employment."6 Because of the EEOC's
primacy in the field, no limitations are imposed on its jurisdiction over
racial issues. In those situations where the NLRB retains jurisdiction,
because the remedies of the NLRB and EEOC are different. Moreover these situations
are analogous to the Borg-Warner 8(b)(3) violations (see p. 947 supra) in that although
racial discrimination is present, there are other independent bases for NLRB jurisdiction,
In the second and fourth situations, although the EEOC and NLRB remedies can be
identical, the Board has a jurisdictional basis apart from racial discrimination. If conflict does arise, it will have to be dealt with by the two agencies.
73 In rebutting the argument that the EEOC was the proper forum, the court noted
that while the EEOC has no enforcement powers, the NLR.B can issue cease and desist
orders. - F.2d at - n.11.
74 If United Packinghouse reaches the Supreme Court and is reversed, no further
action is necessary in the area of employer racial discrimination. If followed, however,
Congress should act. See note 75 infra.
75 In the area of union racism, a similar allocation is proposed in Sherman, Union's
Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. R.aV. 771,
803-19 (1965). There appear to be a number of ways in which this scheme of apportionment can be implemented. Congress, in amending title VII, can define each agency's
jurisdiction. If Congress fails to face the issue, the agencies themselves can enter into an
agreement concerning their roles in the field of racial discrimination. The judicial technique of case-by-case development is ill-suited to draw the fine lines that are necessary
if each agency's sphere of operation is to be clearly fixed. Although courts could accomplish an allocation of power by finding the NLRB's procedures invalid, thus leaving the
field to the EEOC, it is doubtful that such judicial action would be responsive to the
particular interests of each agency. If the choice is therefore between Congress and the
agencies, action by the former seems preferable. Congress can be explicit, its directives
have the force of law, and its duties include the determination of which agency should
administer its laws.
76 In addition to the afguments presented earlier, if the EEOC gains enforcement
powers, it should acquire a greater degree of expertise than the NLRB in handling racial
issues because of the commission's continual exposure to them.
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therefore, the EEOC has concurrent power;7 7 in all other situations the
EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction. Hopefully Congress will resolve the
jurisdictional overlap when and if it confers enforcement powers on
the EEOC. If it does not, judicial or administrative action will be
necessary. In any event, Congress, the courts, and the two agencies
should be prepared to do more than "rock along in a kind of non78
definitive approach."
James M. Hughes
77 Arguably, the NLRB should have exclusive jurisdiction in those areas where concurrent jurisdiction is recommended, thus eliminating all overlap between the two agencies.
However, although the major premise of this note is that the EEOC should have exclusive
jurisdiction over solely racial issues, the converse-that the NLRB should have exclusive
jurisdiction in those situations in which it may properly act-is not necessarily true. When
only racial discrimination is involved, there is no reason, and possibly no statutory
authority, for the NLRB to duplicate the EEOC's efforts. When racial discrimination and
a separate § 7 or § 8 issue are involved, however, both agencies have the power to intervene,
and in neither case does a valid policy consideration vitiate the power.
Practically, conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the NLRB would impose upon the
EEOC the difficult task of attempting to predict whether the first category of 8(b)(2)
violations or a Borg-Warner 8(b)(3) violation preempted its exercise of jurisdiction over
racial discrimination. The Board has no similar difficulty where the EEOC has exclusive
jurisdiction, for it has only to avoid racial "fair representation" violations and the second
category of 8(b)(2) violations.
In the areas of concurrent jurisdiction, a theory of res judicata should be formulated
so that a complainant disappointed before one agency cannot thereafter bring the same
complaint before the other. In addition, it might be desirable to institute a transferral
procedure under which the NLRB can transfer complaints to the EEOC when the latter
is the proper forum.
78 Excised from Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(aXl) and (3) of the Labor
Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNL L.Q. 491, 494 (1967).

